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SHOULD A CHRISTIAN LAWYER SERVE
THE GUILTY?
Thomas L. Shaffer*
People who teach or practice law are in some ways like public
executioners or the Air Force officers who watch over the buttons
that will send nuclear missiles into action: Other people, ordinary
people, want to know what we do to overcome what seem to ordi-
nary people to be moral obstacles to doing what we do.
What ordinary people say to lawyers, and what my students say
when they first come to law school, when they are still more ordi-
nary people than they are law students, is this: How can lawyers
lend their skills and talents to the representation of people who
harm society?
The reason that question keeps coming up is that the answers
given to it by the American legal profession are not sensible. An
example: At least since about 1850 the American legal profession,
when asked why lawyers represent guilty people, has said that
guilty people aren't really guilty. "Guilt" is a lawyer's word; it
means the judgment pronounced by the state on someone accused
of crime. In our system, it means the judgment pronounced by ajudge and jury after the accused person has been given what we
call a fair trial.1
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; member of the
Indiana Bar. B.A., 1958, University of Albuquerque; J.D., 1961, University of Notre Dame;
LL.D., 1983, St. Mary's University. This was a lecture, by the same title, given in the Cs.
Lewis Series, for the New Oxford Society, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 10, 1988. It reviews and restates an argument devel-
oped at greater length in T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAwYER 35-104 (1981).
1 The grandfather of American legal ethics, David Hoffman, in taking up the question as
part of his Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, II A CouRsE oF LEGAL STuDY
(2d ed. 1836), in T. SHAFFER, AMERicAN LEGAL ETHics 59-68 (1985), was quizzical and un-
clear. See Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38
MD. L. REv. 673 (1979). In the next intellectual generation in the profession, Judge (and
Dean) George Sharswood was much clearer and generally of the view stated in the text--
Essay on Professional Ethics (1854) (4th ed. 1876), in 32 AIERIcAN BAR AssocIAoN RE-
PORTS (1907), and in T. SHAFFER, supra, at 177-78, 197-202, 220-22, 224-30. In the third
generation, the generation of codes, the position described here had become settled conven-
tion. Jones, Code of Ethics Adopted by the Alabama Bar Association (1887), 118 Ala. xxiii
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One of the things "fair trial" means is a trial at which the ac-
cused person has a lawyer on his side.2 Therefore, this answer goes,
no one is guilty until he has been found guilty after he has had a
lawyer's help. So one of our official professional ways of answering
the old, old question is to say that the person who asks the ques-
tion doesn't understand what guilt means. The problem with this
traditional answer is that ordinary people who are not easily intim-
idated by lawyers will say that they do know what guilt is. They
don't have to wait for the state to certify it. Dirty Harry knows
what guilt is. So did Captain Furillo of "Hill Street Blues." So do
you. There are cases of doubt, of course, but in cases that cause
ordinary people to ask lawyers the old, old question, there is not
doubt. Someone has murdered an old woman or raped a child or
poured noxious poison into the river. It is obvious that the deed
was done, and obvious who did it. You can tell because the first
thing the guilty party says to himself is, "Gee, I am in trouble. I
better get myself a good lawyer." Good lawyer means clever, re-
sourceful lawyer, "someone who can get me off."
And so the guilty person gets a clever lawyer, and the clever law-
yer does his best, and the culprit avoids being certified as guilty by
the state, which means that he is restored to civilized society, there
no doubt to continue his evil career. Ordinary people know what
they're talking about when they ask law teachers: How can lawyers
help guilty people?
Another of our official professional answers says that lawyers
may serve the guilty because the state, the "system," needs them
to do it. You can't punish the guilty if you don't give them a fair
trial first. You can't have a fair trial unless the guilty person has a
lawyer to help him. Therefore you need lawyers. The state needs
lawyers. Lawyers do not, after all, serve guilty people; they serve
the state. As I once argued to myself, when I defended a member
(1899); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908); Shaffer, The
Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988).
2 See, for example, Judge Sharswood's analysis of the celebrated Courvoisier case in
London:
[I]s not the prisoner in every case entitled to have the evidence carefully sifted,
the weak points of the prosecution exposed, the reasonable doubts presented
which should weigh in his favor? And what offence to truth or morality does
his advocate commit in discharging that duty to the best of his learning and
ability? What apology can he make for throwing up his brief?.
Sharswood, supra note 1, quoted in T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 178.
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of the American Nazi Party,3 I am not lending my skill and talents
to organized hate: I am not serving evil; I am serving the
Constitution.
I decided later that that answer won't do. Service to the
state-even service to the Constitution-will not excuse service to
evil. Surely that is clear in terms of ordinary morality. Ordinary
people understand ordinary morality; that's why they are not per-
suaded by this second official professional answer to the old, old
question.
If the ordinary people I am talking about happen also to be ordi-
nary Jews or Christians, with some understanding of the ethical
traditions of their faith, they may add that a theory that allows
service to the state to trump elementary perceptions of evil is idol-
atry. It depends on a maneuver that puts the state where God
ought to be.4
To say, though, that the legal profession's official answers to the
old, old question are fatuous is not to say that there is no answer.
My concern for most of the last twenty years has been to see if I
can work out sensible answers to old, old questions in legal ethics,
and particularly to see if I can do this within the context of the
story of Israel and of the Cross-the story of Jews and Christians."
On this question of guilty clients, which is the oldest of the old,
old questions for lawyers, I have found it useful to make some dis-
tinctions. I make distinctions because I am a Roman Catholic. My
peculiar branch of the Hebraic tradition includes the medieval
Scholastics, who have taken a lot of grief for their hair-splitting
and counting angels on the points of pins, but the Scholastics had
a useful canon for argument: Never deny, they said; seldom affirm;
always distinguish. I have some distinctions I want to make, now,
on this old, old question of lawyers serving the guilty.
The first distinction is between being guilty and being repulsive.
The second is between being guilty and being punished. And the
third is between being faithful and being loyal.
3 Shaffer, supra note 1, at 698-703.
4 See Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the Religious Tradition, in THE
WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW 315 (J. White & F. Alexander eds. 1988).
' See T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987).
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I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING GUILTY AND BEING
REPULSIVE
The first thing you notice when you think about repulsive peo-
ple, as distinguished from guilty people, and when you do this
thinking in the light of the Gospel, is that Jesus of Nazareth
seemed to prefer the repulsive. He went to parties with tax collec-
tors,8 who were the First Century equivalents of 20th century
bosses of organized crime. He was generous to prostitutes, thieves,
Samaritans, and Roman army officers.7 He seemed always to turn
toward the repulsive-for his meals,8 when he took a drink of
water, when he wanted to give a lesson about prayer to his fellow
Pharisees,' and even while he was being tortured to death in the
name of the law.10 That fact from the Gospel and parallel curiosi-
ties one could assemble from the moral teachings of the Rabbis"
don't answer the question of how a lawyer who is also a Jew or a
Christian can serve the guilty-but those images from Scripture
give us fair warning that the answer is not as simple as either law-
yers or ordinary people think.
It is not a bad thing that society regards certain people as repul-
sive. No human institution or community could exist unless we
did. All of our communities define themselves by excluding repul-
sive people. Our institutions-institutions such as the criminal law,
the courts, the legal profession-serve this elementary and essen-
tial need that the community has: They assist in locating and iden-
tifying in a public way those who cannot be members of the
community. 2
In this way the Torah and the priesthood excluded from the
community those who harmed society, from murderers and thieves
to adulterers and people who had contagious skin diseases.' 3 Jesus
Matthew 9:10-13.
7 Matthew 8:5-13; Luke 7:1-10; John 4:46-53. See Acts ch. 10.
See supra note 6.
9 Luke 18:9-14.
10 Luke 23:39-43.
' J. JEREMIAS, THE PARABLES OF JESUS (3d rev. ed. 1972); J. PETUCHOWSKI, OUR MASTERS
TAUGIT. RABBINIC STORIES AND SAYINGS (1982).
12 S. DINrrz, R. DYNES & A. CLARKE, DEVIANCE: STUDIES IN THE PROCESS OF STIGMIATIZATION
AND SOCIETAL REACTION (1969); K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966).
13 Mark 1:40-45; Leviticus ch. 13; Mouw, Biblical Revelation and Medical Decisions, in




of Nazareth did not quarrel with such legal institutions in his com-
munity. He honored them. The rules said that you should not
touch a leper, for example-that if you did you became a leper.
When Jesus cured the leprous man, he chose to do so by touching
him. That meant, as St. Mark's Gospel says, that Jesus could no
longer go into the town. It also meant that the cured leper should
go to the priests and have his cure checked out, and that is what
Jesus told him to do.14
In the same way, Jesus honored the rigorous rule of the Torah
that an adulterous woman was to be stoned to death. He did not
dispense with that rule either, or disregard it; what he did was call
for the witnesses that the Torah required before the stoning could
take place.' 5 What he did in both cases was to turn toward the
repulsive, to take their side, to be with them. If we take the Gospel
stories as moral models, Jesus says to us, his followers, that we
should turn to the repulsive, to those our communities tell us, for
good reason, to avoid. The lesson says to separate the condition of
being guilty from the condition of being repulsive. The Gospel
gives no warrant for turning away from repulsive people, even
though there are sound moral, social and legal reasons for doing so.
The distinction between the repulsive and the guilty gives com-
fort to a lawyer. It doesn't answer everything that comes up when
you think about serving the guilty, but it helps. I think, for exam-
ple, of the time I was appointed by the United States District
Judge to represent a prisoner who had been convicted of raping a
five-year-old child.16 Guilt was certainly an issue in that assign-
ment, but revulsion was a more serious problem for me. It was a
problem for other lawyers, too. I asked a colleague of mine, an ex-
pert in criminal law, for some advice on the case. The first thing he
said to me was, "Well, if you get him out, I hope he moves in next
door to you."
Revulsion is an issue when it is absent, too. The best guilty cli-
ents-the ones we lawyers most like to work for-are not repulsive.
They are college-educated, pleasant people who eat well, drive fine
automobiles, take vacations without regard to cost, and are gener-
ous to their neighbors. They are guilty not of rape or armed rob-
" Mark 1:40-45.
'5 John 8:1-11.
10 Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968).
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bery but of such things as price-fixing, securities fraud, water pol-
lution, oppression of the poor in the Third World, and making
illegal political contributions. These activities get a person into
trouble, but they don't make him repulsive. In fact, the guilty who
are not repulsive avoid getting into trouble more often than the
repulsive guilty do. They understand, as the repulsive guilty do
not, that lawyers are most helpful when they keep you out of
trouble.
The case of the unrepulsive guilty is one we have to return to
later, when we discuss the distinction between being faithful and
being loyal; for present purposes their situation perhaps shows that
being guilty is not the same thing as being repulsive.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING GUILTY AND BEING
PUNISHED
The interesting thing about the legal profession's second official
answer to the problem of serving the guilty was that it involved
turning to power, turning to the state, serving not the person of
the guilty, but, as I once told myself, serving the Constitution.
The interesting thing that the Gospel says about revulsion, as dis-
tinguished from guilt, is that the moral thing to do is to turn to-
ward the repulsive person, to reach out to that person, to reach
through his repulsiveness. It is fairly evident that we are in the
presence of a radically different approach to a professional prob-
lem; but, even so, the scriptural approach to revulsion does not
reach the question of guilt.
The second distinction I am provoked to by my Scholastic fore-
bears is the distinction between guilt and punishment. Let's con-
cede that the person the lawyer is serving is a guilty person, in the
sense that ordinary people know him to be guilty. Assume a not-
doubtful case of guilt and ask whether it is a moral thing for a
lawyer to use her efforts in such a case to avoid the law's punish-
ment for the guilty person.
I suppose the clearest case in the Gospel is, again, the woman
taken in adultery. The Torah prescribes death by stoning in such a
case. s Jesus was asked by some law professors if they should fol-
low the Torah and execute the punishment. Guilt was not at is-
17 Id.; supra note 3.
'8 Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy 22:23-24.
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sue-not, at any rate, guilt in the ordinary person's sense of the
word.
Jesus said, "Let him who is without guilt cast the first stone."'"
The story is often told as if its meaning was that we are all guilty,
so why should she be punished when we are not? The professors
were wrong to judge the woman. That meaning is sentimentally
attractive, but it cannot be the meaning of the story. A civil order
in which no offender was punished would be a chaotic civil or-
der-no order at all. And, besides that, in this case, Jesus and the
law professors were dealing with a bit of law that had been given to
them by the Creator of the Universe. It is unlikely, even if it is
sentimentally attractive, that Jesus was saying: "Oh, come on, fel-
lows (wink, wink)-let her go."
Nor was Jesus saying that the punishment was out of all propor-
tion to the offense. To a modern reader it seems to be, but a first-
century rabbi would not have said that, because the punishment as
well as the offense are in the Torah, and it is not possible to repeal
the Torah. The Jewish tradition does deal with the problem of
punishments being excessive.20 Jews, then and now, place an al-
most absolute value on human life.2 1 But you have to be a good
lawyer to honor both Torah and tradition. And Jesus's professional
ancestors, the Rabbis who preserved and taught the Torah, were
very good lawyers indeed. What they had done was to ponder the
will of God in the Torah so thoroughly as to make capital punish-
ment unlikely.
In capital cases, the Torah requires two eye witnesses.' That
and other requirements made it unlikely-virtually impossible, in
fact-that an adulterous woman would be stoned. What Jesus was
doing, when he said, "Let him who is without guilt cast the first
stone," was calling for the application of the law requiring two wit-
nesses (who would be called upon to cast the first stones).23 When
the law professors turned away, they were saying to him, and to
the woman, that no one was there to be a witness. They had failed
"9 John 8:7.
20 PENTATEUCH AND HAFORAo s (J. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1986). on Deuteronomy 21:18-22.
21 See id.; SiFRP. A TANNArlIC COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK oF Dn oTENOMY. PsK.A 218-20
(R Hammer trans. 1986); E WSFEL A JEw TODAY 172-75 (1978).
Deuteronomy 17.6-7. See also Z. FALK INTRODUCTION TO JEWISii LAW OF THE SECOND
COM1oNWESALTH 118 (1972).
3Z. FALK, supra note 22. Compare Acts 7:58-60.
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to prove their case.
Then, as you will recall, Jesus pointed out to the woman that no
one remained to condemn her. And, he said, he would not con-
demn her either. She was free to go. She had had a good lawyer.
She had been found not guilty.24
And there, I think, you have a distinction between being guilty
and being punished. There is no doubt that the woman was guilty;
the story assumes that. But a lawyer, invoking legal requirements,
stepped between her guilt and her punishment, and she went free.
It's a distinction we lawyers often find attractive. I once repre-
sented a man who was in prison for life because he had been found
guilty of kidnapping a policeman in Indianapolis and taking the
policeman's car to Albuquerque, New Mexico.2 5 The facts of the
case were such that punishment-life in a maximum-security
prison-seemed excessive. Not that kidnapping a police officer
should be taken lightly, but this case had some, as we say, extenu-
ating circumstances: My client was a pimp quietly going about his
business, in the appropriate part of town, when he encountered the
policeman. The policeman was not after my client for violating the
law. He was shaking him down and he had just raised his rates. My
client had a short fuse. He pushed the policeman back into the
policeman's car and drove out into the country and dumped him in
a ditch. My client did drive the car to Albuquerque, and he did
commit all of the acts which the law says are necessary to establish
kidnapping, which is a very serious offense. But I didn't see any
reason why he should spend his life in jail, and I was happy to try
to get him out.
The scriptural question, the ethical question for a lawyer who
wants to deal with this business of serving the guilty in the light of
Hebraic faith, is whether there is anything that says the guilty
must be punished. We lawyers often think, particularly when we
are all steamed up about our side of a case, that there is nothing
that says the guilty must be punished. If we are pressed on the
point, we chop a little logic and say: Look, the same set of laws
that provides for punishment here also gives me a license to do my
best to avoid punishment. The same rules apply, on both sides of
the case. If you, the accuser, are going to point to the punishment
2 John 8:10-11; K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS 232-36 (T. and T. Clark ed. 1961).
25 Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969).
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rule, I am going to ask you to read on down the page and notice
that the rules provide for a lawyer to show why, under the rules,
the punishment should not be imposed. And the rules say I can do
that when the accused is guilty.
The only answer I have thought of, or heard of, to that logic is
that the will of God prescribes punishment, even if the law of man
does not; that there is something in the divine order that requires
punishment for the guilty. I don't read our heritage, our tradition,
or our Scripture to say that. I am open to learning something on
the point, but I haven't learned anything yet.26
III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING FAITHFUL AND BEING
LOYAL
I said I would need to return to the case of the unrepulsive
guilty-the pleasant and generous people who are guilty of exploit-
ing the poor, polluting the environment, fixing prices, and cor-
rupting public officials.
It is possible to pursue this situation fairly far-to include busi-
ness and financial activity that is apparently well within the law. It
is not hard to imagine entirely legal exploitation of the poor; the
history of industrial America until about 1940 is primarily a his-
tory of such exploitation. Most forms of environmental pollution
have been legal, and many of them are still legal. The corruption of
public officials is usually not a matter of overt bribery; one of
Philip Marlowe's powerful antagonists once said, when Marlowe
accused him of bribing police officers: "[D]on't go around thinking
that I buy politicians or law enforcement officers. I don't have
to."122
26 I did not, by the way, get my kidnapper out of jaiL I did my best, but I failed. Only one
of the four judges who heard the case agreed with me about it. See Sims, 411 F.2d at 667
(Kiley, J., dissenting); but part of my argument was later accepted by the same court. Alicea
v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 922 (7th Cir. 1982). My client made the best of the situation; he
took a job playing clarinet in the prison orchestra, and that got him out of the house once in
a while. He died in prison five years later. I didn't succeed for the fellow who was convicted
of raping the child either. There I got two of four judges. See Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251,
255 (7th Cir. 1967) (Hastings, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968). The district
court's opinion in Mr. Weaver's favor was not published. In the Nazi case, I did better, he
was restored to his companions by the trial judge, who found, in an unreported opinion, that
the Indiana Anti-Hate Act violated the fifth amendment to the federal Constitution. See
Shaffer, supra note 1, at 698-703.
7 R CHANDLER, THE LONG GOODBYE 193 (1954) (Ballantine ed. 1971).
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There is a lot of interesting ethical territory in there, but I am
not proposing to get into it at first. I want at first to get into cases
of the unrepulsive guilty: The commercial employer who has a
tough time making a profit and who needs lawyers to help him
figure out how to pay less than the minimum wage, or how to avoid
his employees' legal right to organize and bargain collec-
tively-have a union-and not get caught at it; or who, having
evaded the law on wages or unions, wants to avoid punishment.28
The polluter who has undoubtedly polluted but who would like his
lawyer to show him how to hold the public authorities at bay until
he can make another year or two of profit-and then he will obey
the law.29
What makes these cases different is that they are continuing en-
terprises. The clients of mine that I told you about were like the
woman taken in adultery or the thief on the cross: Their crimes
were in the past. The thief on the cross was dying; Jesus told the
woman to go and sin no more, and I'm sure she did as she was told;
my rapist and my kidnapper had committed the crimes they were
accused of committing, or not. But not so the exploiter, the pol-
luter, the price fixer, or the corrupter of public officials. They want
lawyers to assist them in continuing to do what they are doing.
The moral issue that is raised here has less to do with frustrating
retributive justice than with complicity. The question is whether a
lawyer should lend his assistance to wrong that has yet to occur.
The disagreement between ordinary people and lawyers on this
question is the clearest of all. The ordinary, decent thing to do
when you seem to be getting into murky moral territory-and I'm
just sure your mothers told you this-is to get out. When in doubt,
don't. Our capacity for self-deception is infinite; mothers under-
stand that. If we stay in the murky territory, even for a little while,
we will manage to persuade ourselves that it is all right to be there.
The safe moral thing to do is to get out while the still small voice
that is whispering in your ear is the voice of your guardian angel
and not the voice of the fallen angel on the other shoulder.
The American lawyer's official answer is just exactly the oppo-
site. Our official answer says that we are not responsible for what
28 See T. SHAFFER & J. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING ch. 2 (2d ed. 1987).
29 A similar case is analyzed in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILITY
158-61 (4th ed. 1987).
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our clients do. We need not be concerned about what they do with
the learning and skill they buy from us, nor for what we think they
plan to do with what they ask us to do for them." As long as we
ourselves stay within the bounds of the law-that is, we do nothing
illegal ourselves-and do not advise our clients to break the law,
we are being professionally moral. Our clients may use our advice
to cheat the poor, poison the consumer, and ruin society. But we
claim-and the law gives us-a license not to have to answer for
our clients.31
In theory-in ethical concept-this quickly becomes a drama of
mutually closed awareness. The lawyer, who is not responsible for
what his clients do, simply tells them what they can do-or can get
away with-under the law. The client, who lives in a complex and
over-regulated world, depends on his lawyer for guidance. In all
probability, the client expects moral advice, although he may not
put it exactly that way. In any event he does not get moral advice,
because the lawyer, who is not responsible for his client's moral
life, avoids giving moral advice. The possibility of two consciences
meeting one another in that sort of drama has been excluded in
principle.
I like the way one of Louis Auchincloss's lawyers put the pro-
position, when he was talking to the wife of a young lawyer who
worked with him: "Your client wants you to do something grasping
and selfish. But quite within the law. As a lawyer you're not his
conscience, are you? You advise him that he can do it. So he does
it and tells his victim: 'My lawyer made me!' You're satisfied, and
so is he . . -.32
That is the conceptual world our official ethics describe. It is not
the one that exists in fact, I am happy to be able to tell you. In
fact, business lawyers are sources of moral advice for their clients.
In fact, the clients of business lawyers want moral advice from
their lawyers. In fact, official professional ethics do not describe
the moral world in which business people and lawyers meet one
another. Lawyers are chosen by business clients-and paid very
well-because they are sensitive to moral questions. And, anyway,
See R. RODES, LAw AND LmBEATION (1986).
Shaffer, supra note 1.
LJ AuCHINCLOss, THE GREAT WORLD AND TIMOTHy COLT 73 (1956). See T. SHAFFER,
supra note 1, at 367-415.
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business people do not succeed because they are rapacious and im-
moral; the rapacious and immoral do not always fail, but they
often fail, and, often, the reason they fail is that they are rapacious
and immoral.
Why is that? It is because most people in law practice and in
business carry around with them the morals they learned in their
families, their neighborhoods, and their religious congregations.
This morality is, by and large, religious, because most people in
America-even those who go to college-are religious people:
Ninety-four percent of Americans believe in God; seventy per cent
of us claim an institutional religious affiliation; more than half of
us regularly go to services23 There is a moral universe out there;
people find it possible to be moral in it. You can't always tell that
if you go to the movies-or to college-or watch television, but it's
true. The most important ethical job we who teach in professional
schools have is to respect the morals our students bring to us-to
respect them and to try to persuade our students that those morals
are serviceable in the professions.
This serviceable moral universe is not private either. It is a com-
munal phenomenon and a communal enterprise. It exists among us
as a shared thing. It is just not true that a lawyer working in the
world walks through a moral minefield in which no one respects
her ethical sensitivity and everyone is trying to corrupt her. It is
possible to find moral support in our communities, from other per-
sons. Lawyers can expect to find that moral support from clients,
and clients can expect to find it from their lawyers.
If that is so, then the sort of moral world we live in is one in
which moral influence is possible and may be routine. It is likely
that our association with one another will make each of us a better
person. And if that is so, then it is relevant for any profes-
sional-and especially a lawyer-to ask, as to each of her clients: Is
this person becoming a better person because of me?
Here is where I want to distinguish between loyalty and faithful-
ness. If I am faithful to you, I may sometimes decide to risk your
being annoyed with me and tell you what I think will make you a
better person. It may not be what you want to hear, or even what
you are prepared to do. But I would argue-as a teacher of lawyers
who sees as relevant the scriptural morality of Jews and Chris-
3 Report No. 259, Religion in America, THE GALLUP REPORT (April 1987).
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tians-that it is part of the job. Another way to put this is to no-
tice the way Aristotle defined the virtue of friendship 3' Friends
are people who seek to make one another better; they are collabo-
rators in the good. They are faithful to one another in their mutual
interest in being good people. This is more than loyalty: Loyalty
takes the friend's side, regardless. Loyalty hates those whom the
friend proposes to hate. Faithfulness is willing to risk disloyalty.
Faithfulness is willing to try to influence the friend. Faithfulness is
what makes it possible to negotiate the problem of the guilty client
who wants my legal services in order to do something disgusting.
CONCLUSION
I have consulted the biblical model for professional service and
seen there that the theological professional ethic says to turn to-
ward the repulsive person, not away from him. His guilt may or
may not be a moral problem for me, but his repulsiveness should
not be; if it is, there is something the matter with me-not with
him who is repulsive, but with me.
That same biblical model makes it possible, then, for me to en-
gage the question of guilt and to distinguish between guilt and
punishment. It does not follow as night follows day that punish-
ment should follow guilt. At least, in dealing with frail and fallible
human institutions, I am entitled as a professional to see to it that
the legal engines of punishment operate according to their own
rules-one of which is that I am entitled to use the rules to avoid
the punishment provided in the rules.
And then, finally, I am faced with the possibility of complicity in
evil. The problem now is not so much that my client is guilty as
that he wants to be, and he wants me to help him become guilty. I
am entitled there to take account of a theological view of what an-
other human person is; to take as my professional mandate-that
is, as what I am being paid to do-being concerned for his moral
welfare; and to exert my professional influence in such a way that
there is a chance for that person to change his mind.
Things are never that clear, of course. Rarely do you meet a per-
son, even in the law office, who wants to do something manifestly
disgusting. When you do, it is much easier than you might suppose




to talk him out of it. Rarely is moral advice given with the label
"moral," but sometimes it is; and the best lawyers know when
what they are giving is moral advice, and they become very good at
giving it. Rarely is moral advice given with "thus saith the Lord"
directness; it usually comes when people are talking together as
friends.3 5
What makes complicity in evil unlikely is the steady desire for
the welfare of the other person. That requires healthy respect for
what we bring to our professions from family, town, and religious
congregation. It requires clear sight. And it requires enough confi-
dence and moral courage to risk the possibility that the advice may
not be taken, that the evil course may after all be the one the cli-
ent chooses.
It would be a useful thing to finish this with some ringing decla-
ration from one of the past presidents of the American Bar Associ-
ation-but I won't. Instead I am going to leave you with a rela-
tively laconic observation from a born-again Christian lawyer who
practices in a little town in Tennessee and spends much of his time
talking to worried lawyers and law students, trying to make his
profession better from the ground up. His name is John Acuff. He
practices in Cookeville, Tennessee. John came up to Charlottes-
ville, when I was teaching there, and gave a talk to the Law Stu-
dent Christian Fellowship. After the talk, one of the students
asked John if he does any criminal-defense practice. That ques-
tion, when translated, is the question I have been talking to you
about tonight. When translated, the question to John was, "Do you
represent guilty people?"
John's laconic answer was this: "Yes. When I think I can do
some good."
35 See Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L. REV.
957 (1978), in T. SHAFFER, supra note 1, at 436.
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